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particular, the province of Quebec. As will be argued, the “accommodation crisis” in Quebec 
resulted from two related developments: i) a misapplication of the term “reasonable 
accommodation” taken from disability law which has allowed it to be perceived as providing 
undeserved preferential treatment to minorities and; ii) the practice of interculturalism that then 
magnifies this perception of preferential treatment as obstructing the integration of minorities 
into the dominant French-language culture. In part, this explains why the accommodation crisis 
occurred in Quebec and has sparked a far more virulent blowback in that province than in the 
rest of Canada. This suggests that, while some might argue that interculturalism is 
“complementary” to multiculturalism, multiculturalism can also be in opposition to and even 
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Résumé: Cet article explore “un retour à l’hébergement raisonnable » au Canada et, en 
particulier, dans la province de Québec.  Comme nous le ferons valoir, la « crise du logement » 
au Québec résulte de deux développements connexes :  i) une application erronée du terme 
« accommodement raisonnable » tiré de la loi sur l’invalidité qui lui a permis d’être perçu 
comme offrant un traitement préférentiel imméritée aux minorités et, ii) la pratique de 
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multiculturalisme, le multiculturalisme peut aussi être en opposition et même antagoniste aux 
objectifs de l’interculturalisme.   
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This paper is an exploration of “reasonable accommodation blowback” in Canada and, in 
particular, the province of Quebec. As will be argued below, the “accommodation crisis” in 
Quebec resulted from two related developments: i) a misapplication of the term “reasonable 
accommodation” taken from disability law which has allowed the term to be perceived as 
providing undeserved preferential treatment to minorities and; ii) the unique promotion and 
practice of interculturalism in the province of Quebec that then magnifies this perception of 
preferential treatment as obstructing the integration of minorities into the dominant French-
language culture. In good part, these related developments explain why the accommodation crisis 
occurred mostly in Quebec and have sparked a far more virulent blowback in that province than 
in the rest of Canada. The character of the crisis suggests that, while some might argue that 
interculturalism is “complementary” to multiculturalism (Meer and Modood, 2012: 175) or “does 
not contradict the stated multicultural ideology” (Anctil, 2011: 4), multiculturalism can also be in 
opposition to and even antagonistic to the goals of interculturalism. As will be argued below, it is 
confusion over the use of reasonable accommodation and the way this confusion feeds into and 
warps the very concerns that back the practice of interculturalism. An explanation of this 
complex relationship will allow for a clearer understanding of the “accommodation crisis” in 
Quebec as well as problems with the practice of interculturalism within liberal democracies such 
as Canada. 
I 
The term “reasonable accommodation blowback” is a reference to strong negative 
responses to the discussion and application of reasonable accommodation rather than existent 
anti-immigrant, racist sentiment or ethnic strife. In Canada, a well-known example of reasonable 
accommodation blowback is the so-called “Hérouxville Affair,” which refers to the controversy 





over the “life standards”, “code of conduct” or “rules of behaviour” charter issued in early 2007 
by the municipal council of the rural farming town of Hérouxville and designed to warn new 
immigrants that they were obliged to leave behind cultural practices that did not conform to the 
dominant values of the Québécois. As widely reported in the media, this document, which 
originally included a prohibition against “killing women in public beatings,” was not the product 
of brewing racial conflict or any event specific to the municipality. Hérouxville, with a 
population of 1300, is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically homogeneous. It has almost no 
immigrant population and, by default, no local racial or anti-immigrant tensions. Instead, the 
“charter” was created as a direct response to the wider discourse on multiculturalism and the 
application of reasonable accommodation in Quebec and, more specifically, the island of 
Montreal, where the vast proportion of immigrants to Quebec settle.  
André Drouin, Hérouxville town councilor and the main author of the document, 
explained his motivation during his testimony at the “Consultation Commission on 
Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences”, more widely known as the 
“Bouchard-Taylor Commission” hearings headed up by Quebec academics Gérard Bouchard and 
Charles Taylor and charged with investigating the practice of accommodating cultural minorities 
in the province about a month after the Hérouxville Affair. Referencing specific controversies 
over accommodation in the province, Drouin exclaimed that “we demand that the practice of 
Canadian courts of accommodating religion in Canada and Quebec cease immediately” and that 
“The Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a tool to destroy our country” (Drouin, 2007). In their 
final report, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Bouchard and Taylor recognized the 
common acceptance of Drouin’s view in the province:  
Many Quebecers have expressed the fear that freedom of religion, which is protected by 
the charters, may be cited to justify practices that run counter to the principle of gender 





equality. This fear was often reinforced by mistrust of the courts, which were suspected 
of promoting an overly lax or permissive interpretation of freedom of conscience, thus 
supporting practices that should not be tolerated in a liberal democracy (2008: 56). 
 
At least here, Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as Quebec’s Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms are described as protectors of illiberal cultural practices. Because they 
protect the intolerant values of minorities under the pretext of freedom of religion and 
conscience, they are understood to be destructive and detrimental to liberal democracy. On the 
face of it, this is a rather perplexing dilemma. These documents, designed to protect the values of 
liberal democracy, are now perceived by some to be obstructions to its practice.  
Bouchard and Taylor explain that views like Drouin’s, no matter how popular or 
accepted, are not the result of actual examples of constitutionally protected cultural or religious 
practices that run contrary to liberal democratic values but are instead articulations of what they 
call a “crisis of perception” of the meaning of reasonable accommodation. They explain that 
“after a year of research and consultation, we have come to the conclusion that the foundations 
of collective life in Québec are not in a critical situation. If we can speak of an ‘accommodation 
crisis,’ it is essentially from the standpoint of perceptions” (2008: 13). The anger, fear and 
mistrust expressed by many Quebecers are simply the result of ignorance or, more charitably, a 
lack of communication. In turn, the “accommodation crisis” epitomized by the Hérouxville 
charter can be easily addressed through better public education and consultation. People who are 
reacting negatively to court protected freedom of religion or conscience are misunderstanding 
what the law actually allows. In turn, much of Building the Future involves investigating and 
cataloguing specific incidents of these kinds of misunderstandings. For example, the report notes 
that there was a “widespread perception” that “Men who accompanied their spouses to prenatal 
classes offered by the CLSC [centre local de services communautaires, local community service 





centre] de Parc-Extension were excluded from the courses at the request of Muslim women who 
were upset by their presence” but that in actual fact this is a service “used, above all, by 
immigrant women, but men are not excluded from it. Evening prenatal courses for expectant 
mothers and their spouses are offered in the two other CLSCs affiliated with the Centre de santé 
et de services sociaux de la Montagne” (2008: 18). Here, and in the dozens of other incidents that 
were said to amount to a growing intolerance of reasonable accommodation, Bouchard and 
Taylor convincingly show that accommodation does not give preferential treatment to minorities.   
Their conclusion is based on the straightforward observation that blowback is 
predominantly a function of ignorance. Reasonable accommodation, while not perfect, has been 
largely successful in Quebec as the province has become more culturally heterogeneous and that 
the vast majority of its citizens has and can continue to accept the changing demographics of the 
province. Again, only through misunderstanding, mistrust and subsequent overheated rhetoric in 
the media and political circles, has there arisen a secondary stigmatization of immigrants 
resulting in the “crisis of perception” that can be addressed and allayed through open and public 
dialogue. Overall, Building the Future does not identify anything intrinsically wrong with the 






This logic, however, does not really explain the persistence of the specific objection to 
reasonable accommodation, or why it manifests so intensely in Quebec. Something else is going 
on. Rather than a “crisis of perception”, blowback is in part a consequence of a misapplication or 
misappropriation of the term reasonable accommodation that has been magnified by the unique 





promotion and practice of interculturalism in Quebec. In Canada, policies of reasonable 
accommodation have been articulated through interpretations of Section 15(1) of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms which specifies that “Every individual is equal before and under the law 
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, 
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability.” Through various court judgments it was decided that in 
particular instances there were legal obligations to actively provide an environment conducive to 
this equality. Initially, the Supreme Court of Canada introduced the idea of reasonable 
accommodation in the 1985 case; Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. 
Simpsons-Sears Ltd. In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that “where it is shown that a 
working rule has caused discrimination it is incumbent upon the employer to make a reasonable 
effort to accommodate the religious needs of the employee, short of undue hardship to the employer 
in the conduct of his business” (par. 20; see also Seidle 2009: 85). The Justices built this 
conception of “reasonable steps to accommodate” religious needs on American laws dealing with 
the “duty to accommodate” the rights of the disabled as well as the provisions of the 1972 
amendment to the American Civil Rights Act of 1964 (referencing Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co; 
Riley v. Bendix Corp; see Simpsons-Sears: par. 20).   
From here, most of the legal debate has focused on what is meant by “undue hardship” in 
the original ruling and “reasonable limits” as described in Section 1 of the Charter, which states 
that rights and freedoms can be “subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” As it has developed, the Supreme Court 
has endorsed a broad and subjective view of when accommodations must be made. Notably, in 
the landmark 1985 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. decision, the Court explained: “[t]he essence of 





the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person 
chooses” and that “[i]t is not for the state to dictate what are the religious obligations of the 
individual, it is for the individual to determine” (at par. 94-95). Similarly, in the more recent 
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, which was precipitated by the 
prohibition of a student wearing a kirpan in public schools, the Court agreed that, regardless of 
the traditional institutional practice of a religion, what matters is “reasonable religiously 
motivated interpretation”(Multani, supra note 1 at para. 36) or individual understanding of 
beliefs and faith. Altogether, the Courts have placed a very high bar on the application of “undue 
hardship” as well as “reasonable limits” to excuse an obligation to accommodate.2  
However, there has been less consideration of the meaning of accommodation itself. As 
mentioned above, the language of accommodation is brought into Canada through a reference to 
American laws on civil rights and the rights of the disabled. This origin suggests that 
accommodation for the practices of religious and ethnic groups and those of the disabled, while 
different in their particular applications, are of the same kind.  Indeed, this is why these groups are 
placed together in Section 15 and why Simpsons-Sears, a case of religious discrimination, was the 
first Charter case in which Canadian groups representing persons with disabilities intervened. The 
interveners argued: 
Protection against practices creating discriminatory effects is crucial for disabled people 
because the individuality of their impairments makes them vulnerable to a wide range of 
superficially neutral obstacles… As a practical matter a narrow interpretation of the word 
discrimination will expose disabled people and members of other protected classes to 
unreasonable and arbitrary barriers to equality, in causes where malicious motive cannot be 
proven (as quoted in Vanhala, 2011: 114).  
 
So, just as Theresa O'Malley, a Seventh-day Adventist prohibited from working from sundown 
Friday to sundown on Saturday, was unintentionally discriminated against by her employers’ 





insistence that she must work during that time, so too are persons with disabilities when faced 
with “able bodied norms” which obstruct them from equal access and movement.3 And so the 
idea that both groups required “accommodation” was established.4  
But, on closer examination, amelioration of discrimination against persons with 
disabilities and members of “other protected classes” are clearly different things and require 
different remedies. Adam Keating describes this critical distinction in his analysis of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA):   
The ADA embodies a fundamental difference from other civil rights statutes which 
prohibit discrimination based upon race, gender, or national origin. Those statutes 
prohibit an employer from discriminating against job applicants and employees based 
upon racial, sexual, or ethnic prejudices. In essence those statutes require the employer to 
turn a blind eye and ignore the individual’s protected characteristic. In contrast, the ADA 
requires more than just equal treatment; it requires employers to make reasonable 
accommodations or adjustments to the workplace for qualified disabled individuals that 
are not offered to non‐disabled individuals (2010: 4-5). 
 
Keating distinguishes reasonable accommodation of the disabled from the distinct goals of racial, 
gender and ethnic equality. As he explains, where the former are accommodated by being treated 
equally, demanding the employer to ignore or “turn a blind eye” to their differences, the latter are 
accommodated by a full and complete recognition of different needs and abilities and an explicit 
adaptation of the work environment. Karlan and Rutherglen put this distinction in even clearer 
terms, writing that “under the civil rights statutes that protect women, blacks, or older workers, 
plaintiffs can complain of discrimination against them, but they cannot insist upon discrimination 
in their favor; disabled individuals often can” (1996: 3).5 They further explain that: 
Put in the broader context of debates over equality, the ADA embraces both a ‘sameness’ 
and a ‘difference’ model of discrimination… In a sameness model, the decisionmaker 
[sic] must ignore the irrelevant characteristic. Treating every worker identically, 
regardless of the presence or absence of a particular disability, satisfies the sameness 
model of equality…. A difference model, by contrast, assumes that individuals who 
possess the quality or trait at issue are different in a relevant respect from individuals who 
don't… Reasonable accommodation clearly rests on a difference model of discrimination 





since it requires employers to treat some individuals-- those disabled persons who would 
be qualified if the employer modified the job to enable them to perform it--differently 
than other individuals (1996: 10-11). 
 
They conclude that: “This emphasis illustrates the profound differences between reasonable 
accommodation and antidiscrimination as methods of regulation” (1996: 14). Notably, this same 
thinking is found in Canada, where the Court decided that, when it comes to ethnicity, race, and 
religion, discrimination means making “distinctions based on presumed rather than actual 
characteristics” whereas avoiding discrimination of the disabled requires “taking into account the 
actual personal characteristics of disabled persons” (Eaton 1997: 66). So, where equality means 
overlooking difference for one group, it means fully and explicitly recognizing and 
accommodating difference for another.     
We can further understand this ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ distinction by applying Isaiah 
Berlin’s well-known categories of “negative liberty” and “positive liberty.” The sameness model 
corresponds to Berlin’s definition of negative liberty: 
Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed 
by others. If I am prevented by other persons from doing what I could otherwise do, I am 
to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain 
minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved. Coercion is not, 
however, a term that covers every form of inability. If I say that I am unable to jump 
more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind, or cannot understand the 
darker pages of Hegel, it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or 
coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the 
area in which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are 
prevented from attaining a goal by human beings. Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not 
lack of political freedom (1969: 122). 
 
This definition of liberty or freedom applies to cases where an individual is obstructed, and thus 
coerced, from being able to work, go to school, or attend any public institution because of their 
religious practice, culture, or gender. It follows that a government wanting to promote a free 





society would apply this definition by removing such obstructions. However, as Berlin goes out 
of his way to note, this definition does not also mean that someone with an “inability,” such as 
being blind, is also obstructed or coerced. Somewhat less clearly, the difference model 
corresponds to his definition of positive liberty: 
The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the 
individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on 
external forces of whatever kind…I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a 
doer…conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them…I feel free to the 
degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize it 
is not (1969: 131). 
 
Here, a government promoting this kind of freedom would be obliged to facilitate a citizen’s 
route to autonomy providing a means for them to gain self-mastery unobstructed by external 
forces. So, for example, with positive liberty a blind person, if they so choose, has the right to do 
a job or go to a school that requires reading even though they, under ordinary circumstances, are 
unable to read. In other words, the government must recognize that what might not be an 
impediment for the many is for the few or even for the one and, in turn, is obliged to provide 
special treatment to remove that obstacle. This different treatment or positive discrimination 
would involve an accommodation. The ADA and other laws promoting the rights of the disable 
function under this conception. 
So, unlike in cases dealing with the disabled, where “barrier-removal” accommodation is 
required, the other groups listed in Section 15 instead most often require changes that would fall 
under what Karlan and Rutherglen call antidiscrimination regulations. Leaving aside the finer 
points of the legal arguments, in the Multani case, the school board had to allow the wearing of 
the kirpan. In Amselem (referenced in endnote 2), the condominium had to allow the Succah on 
the balcony. In Simpsons-Sears and Big M Drug Mart, employers had to allow their employees 





to work or not to work on particular days. At least in this list of examples, there really is no 
accommodation as such, only a requirement to overlook difference. On the face of it, laws and 
policies were changed not to provide any preferential treatment for these individuals, but the 
very opposite: the equal or same opportunity to practice their religion like everyone else. Even 
though they may have not been malicious in their conception or intent, the laws and policies at 
issue in these cases were flawed because they were discriminatory and in turn required 
amendment.  
Altogether, we should be wary of confusing these two distinct remedies and avoid calling 
amendments to a discriminatory law or policy an accommodation because, in the true sense of 
the term, they are not. Lori Beaman sums this problem up well. She argues that: “The language 
of reasonable accommodation, as with the language of tolerance, moves us further from, rather 
than closer to, equality… [allowing] space for arguments based on colonial fear and racism 
rather than on any genuine disadvantaging or inequality. By framing the discussion in the 
language of equality, there is less room for these types of responses” (2011: 443). Arguably, if 
the accommodation narrative could be replaced with an antidiscrimination or equality narrative, 
the erroneous conclusion of unwarranted preferential treatment would be less likely. 
And yet, the way reasonable accommodation was introduced in Canada by the Supreme 
Court, suggests these remedies have indeed been confused. The results of this confusion are on 
clear display in Building the Future: 
During our consultations, a number of participants called into question the legitimacy of 
accommodation requests for religious reasons. The rightfulness of an adjustment that 
allows, for example, a female or a male student to wear a headscarf or a kirpan, 
respectively, is not obvious to everyone. Similar exemptions may be granted for health 
reasons: a young girl must cover her head on her physician’s orders or a diabetic child 
must bring a syringe and a needle to school. No one would dream of objecting to such 
exceptions. We also know that accommodation aimed at ensuring the equality of 
pregnant women or the physically disabled is readily accepted. Québec (and Western) 





public opinion thus reacts much more harshly to requests motivated by religious belief 
(2008: 143). 
 
The authors of the report rejoin that these criticisms stem from the belief that religion is a choice 
whereas a disability is not. We are sympathetic to the infirmed or disabled because they have no 
choice but to live with their circumstances whereas a “Muslim or a Sikh can always choose to no 
longer practice his religion or to practice it differently.” They continue: “A number of people 
thus ask themselves why society should adapt its norms to accommodate personal religious 
choices and occasionally assume the cost of such choices. Does this not come down to according 
religious choice unacceptable preferential treatment in relation to other personal choices?,” and 
respond by asking,  “However, is this not a rather precipitous or cursory manner in which to deal 
with the questions of identity and deep-seated convictions that dwell in the human heart?” and 
later claim that: “In accordance with the law, the harmonization measures requested or granted 
for religious reasons proceed from the same logic” as those provided to people with a physical 
disability (2008: 161). This confusion continues in the final sections of the report: 
We recommend that studies be carried out to clarify the situation of various sub-groups 
and, in particular, to monitor the social development of young people from racialized 
minorities. For the reasons that we have indicated, immigrant women also appear to 
warrant special attention, along with the disabled and homosexuals. These categories of 
citizens are subject to what we called multiple discrimination. Here again, there is an 
obvious need to elaborate indicators to measure the impact of the existing programs 
(2008: 261). 
 
 Bouchard and Taylor miss the point. The “calling into question” of accommodation stems 
from a narrative that confuses the needs of the disabled with the needs of other protected groups. 
The take away for “a number of participants” is that, where one group (i.e. the disabled) 
deservedly gets special treatment, the other group (i.e. the religious or ethnic) does not. Maryse 
Potvin does well to summarize how this concern about “special privileges” given to religious and 





ethnic minorities became the central refrain in the Montreal mass media during the 
accommodation crisis (2010). So, while Bouchard and Taylor argue back that freedom of 
religion is not a flexible choice but a right on par with the rights of the disabled, they also seem 
to recognize that the objection stems from a concern about undeserved or unjustified preferential 
treatment. Therefore, the blowback against reasonable accommodation might be mitigated by a 
more accurate and limited use of the term accommodation that more properly implies 




If all of Canada is subject to the same confusing use of accommodation, why did the 
“accommodation crisis” occur in Quebec?  Bouchard and Taylor explain near the end of their 
report that, where the rest of Canada adopted a policy of multiculturalism toward a goal of 
pluralism, the province of Quebec instead embraced “interculturalism” where “respect for 
diversity was made subordinate to the need to perpetuate the French-language culture” (2008: 
117). Pierre Anctil further suggests that “Perhaps, because of its unique political culture and 
history, Québécois society seemed to be out of tempo with the more sedate approach to pluralism 
found in Anglophone Canada” (2011: 4). However, as will be argued below, the practice of 
interculturalism does not simply mean that Quebec is “out of tempo” with the rest of Canada 
when it comes to pluralism but often in conflict with it. In his review of the development and 
practice of multiculturalism in Canada, Michael Dewing notes that interculturalism is not a 
subdivision of multiculturalism but quite distinct in that:   
[interculturalism] is mainly concerned with the acceptance of, and communication and 
interaction between, culturally diverse groups (cultural communities) without, however, 





implying any intrinsic equality among them. Diversity is tolerated and encouraged, but 
only within a framework that establishes the unquestioned supremacy of French in the 
language and culture of Quebec (2009: 15). 
 
 This rejection of the equality of diverse cultural communities stands in clear opposition to 
the central aim of reasonable accommodation, some of the main features of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, and Canada’s various multicultural laws, including the Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act which declares a policy to “promote the full and equitable participation of 
individuals and communities of all origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of all aspects 
of Canadian society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation” (1985: 
3c). So, on the face of it, while there may be some similar openness to communication and 
interaction and acceptance of diversity, the goals of interculturalism (e.g. to maintain the 
supremacy of the French language and culture) are not complimentary to the goals of 
multiculturalism (i.e. the full and equal participation of all cultures). Consider the clearly 
“intercultural” sentiment at the heart of the controversial Hérouxville charter that first focused 
attention on the crisis and spurred the creation of “Bouchard-Taylor.” Echoing the tenets of 
interculturalism, the document is introduced with an invitation to “all peoples…without regard to 
race or to the color of skin, mother tongue spoken, sexual orientation, religion, or any other form 
of beliefs” to “move to this territory” and is even framed as a guide “to help [immigrants] make a 
clear decision to integrate into our area.”6  
This assertion offers a partial explanation why there was an accommodation crisis in 
Quebec and not in the rest of Canada. Through the lens of interculturalism, the perception that 
reasonable accommodation provides an unnecessary “preferential treatment” for minorities is 
understood as not only unfair but, unique to Quebec, also a threat to the continued practice of the 
dominant Québécois culture or a means by which minorities can waive their obligation to 





integrate. Gérard Bouchard further clarifies this distinctive Québécois concern in his article 
“What is Interculturalism?”:   
In the context of Quebec, feelings of insecurity are also fueled by the growing presence 
of immigrants and cultural minorities, largely concentrated in the area surrounding 
Montreal. This feeling is justified since it is an expression of the fragility of francophone 
Quebec in America, a condition accentuated by globalization and by uncertainty over the 
francization of immigrants. It is also justified to the extent that it affirms the importance 
of preserving fundamental values like gender equality and the separation of church and 
state. Finally, it is accentuated by the fact that the national question remains unresolved 
and even seems to be sliding towards an impasse (2011: 447). 
 
In this context, unlike in the rest of Canada, the main objective is to direct immigrants and 
cultural minorities toward integration with the “French-language culture” majority and, at least 
according to Bouchard, the constitutionally protected policy of multiculturalism is felt to be a 
surreptitious means or backdoor to obstruct the realization of this objective in the province. To 
be clear, the outrage of people like Hérouxville town councilor Drouin stems from the idea that 
groups protected under the banner of multiculturalism are treated as though they are unable or 
“disabled” from participating, receiving undeserved special treatment, when, in his view, they 
are simply unwilling to participate.  
This becomes all the more problematic because the “French-language culture” is further 
associated with Christian traditions, well exemplified by the crucifix hanging in Quebec 
provincial legislature, the National Assembly.
7
 In turn, it is not surprising that superficial 
features of minority religious and ethnic practice, whether kirpans, kippahs, hijabs or niqabs, 
often become the focus of the debate and Québécois cultural anxiety is directed at Sikhs, 
Orthodox Jews, and Muslims living in the province. Advocates of interculturalism place the 
difficult demand on these minorities in particular to, at least, outwardly conform to the “civic” 
and historical traditions of Quebec because they necessarily reject the idea that things like 





religious and ethnic dress should be accommodated. As described in the section above, this 
conflict is the result of the Court’s misappropriation or misapplication of the concept of 
accommodation from the disability jurisprudence to other protected classes, recasting or 
reconfiguring minorities as a distinct kind of citizen unable to fully participating in the prevalent 
culture. So, in the context of Quebec’s accommodation crisis, multiculturalism as practiced 
through policy of reasonable accommodation is seen as an obstruction rather than complimentary 
to interculturalism.   
Charles Taylor also seems to agree that the multicultural goal of equality should 
sometimes be subordinate to cultural supremacy. For example, in the “Politics of Recognition”, 
he claims that: 
A society with strong collective goals can be liberal… provided it is also capable of 
respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who don’t share its common 
goals; and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights. There will 
undoubtedly be tensions and difficulties in pursuing these objectives together, but such a 
pursuit is not impossible, and the problems are not in principle greater than those 
encountered by any liberal society that has to combine, for example, liberty and equality, 
or prosperity and justice (1994: 59-60).  
 
He decides that we can “weigh the importance of certain forms of uniform treatment against the 
importance of cultural survival, and opt sometime in favor of the latter” (1994: 61). In other 
words, Taylor’s view of liberal society can allow for demands for group conformity to what he 
calls “strong collective goals”, even though it seems to marginalize those that are not part of the 
dominant culture nor share in its ends. Notably, his view is offered with a considerable set of 
provisos including a capability to respect diversity, the ability to offer safeguards for 
fundamental rights, as well as the capacity to circumvent tensions and difficulties.  
But, there is an obvious problem with this formulation. As Thomas L. Dumm points out 
in his essay “Strangers and Liberals,” not only does Taylor require the placement of one culture 





in a hierarchically superior position to all others, he also privileges “quasi-permanent cultures” 
over new or impermanent ones (169).
8
 Similarly, Patrick Morag points out: “Taylor draws 
normative conclusions in favour of shared allegiance to a particular historical community and 
reaffirms the republican thesis that it is a precondition of a free regime that citizens have a 
deeper patriotic identification” (37). So, while Taylor may want to deal with the “sense of 
marginalization” of those outside of the dominant culture “without compromising our basic 
political principles” (1994: 63), it simply remains to be seen how this can be achieved while still 
holding onto the notion that patriotism to and the survival of Québécois culture is more valuable 
than all of the other cultural groups that happen to reside within the province.  
Of course, Taylor is quick and forceful in his claim that he is not engaging in anything 
like ethnocentricity. Instead, he calls for the application of Hans Georg Gadamer’s “fusion of 
horizons” (1994: 67), which in this context describes the way interaction between individuals 
broadens and enriches their own sense of self including their ideas, opinions and beliefs and 
which may eventually alter each individual’s culture as a result. While Taylor’s idea may be an 
important addition to a debate about liberal conceptions of the self, it does not really solve the 
problem at hand. It may allow members of cultural groups to better understand and accept each 
other but it does nothing to provide criteria by which we can judge the value of one culture and 
its collective goals over another.
9
 This dichotomy between understanding and value seems to be 
what Taylor is getting at when he finally decides that: 
…one could argue that it is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the 
horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and 
temperaments, over a long period of time—that have, in other words, articulated their 
sense of the good, the holy, the admirable—are almost certain to have something that 
deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to 
abhor and reject (72). 
 





So, in the example of Quebec, the French language culture can be placed in a hierarchically 
superior position because it has provided meaning for a large number of people over a long 
period of time. At least for Taylor, this is the justification for an interculturalism that is not 
simply a fusion of horizons of diverse groups but includes a demand for conformity to the strong 
collective goals of the prevalent culture, which seems to challenge the liberal democratic goals of 
equality and tolerance.
10
 While it is beyond the immediate purpose of this paper to fully explore 
the global implications of this conflict between multiculturalism and interculturalism, this 
critique has some obvious relevance to other liberal democracies, particularly in Europe, 
struggling with the tension between changing ethnic and religious demographics and the desire 
to maintain their traditional cultural heritage.  
All told, in their other writings, both Bouchard and Taylor seem to recognize the tension 
between multiculturalism and interculturalism and yet in their report they conclude that the 
accommodation crisis is a crisis of perception. But, as argued above, the accommodation crisis in 
Quebec is not a crisis of perception at all but a consequence of a clash of the goals of 
multiculturalism and interculturalism.  Again, where multiculturalism empowers individuals to 
articulate their own unique sense of identity, interculturalism demands conformity to the 
prevalent culture.  
It should be noted that this does not mean that interculturalism necessarily implies an 
absence of equality or respect for diversity. Quebec has been able to assert laws and policies 
toward the goal of French-language cultural survival that sometime limits individual rights as 
well as the achievement of the cultural goals of other groups and still remains a culturally diverse 
society. The tensions and difficulties that have developed in the province as a result of these laws 
and policies, such as debates and legal challenges sparked by the introduction of the Charter of 





the French Language- widely known as Bill 101- have eventually been deemed constitutional by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, which recognized “the pressing and substantial concern” to 
maintain a visage linguistique or French face to Quebec (Devine v. Quebec: par. 820). 
Nonetheless, it was just at this same time that the Supreme Court seemed to go in the opposite 
direction with its ruling on a series of Charter challenges based on Section 15 mentioned above. 
They decided that other cultural groups have the right to “reasonable accommodation” when 
subject to discrimination by the predominant class. So, having given credence to the cultural 
goals of the Québécois, the Court then goes about reaffirming the different cultural goals for 
minorities in the province and the rest of the country. Whether it was the intention of the court to 
strike a balance between the prevalent culture and the minority cultural is hard to say but the 
upshot of these decisions seems to be an effort to mitigate the possible excesses of the 
unrestricted application of the dominant cultural goals on minority groups. Unfortunately, the 
misapplication of reasonable accommodation combined with the practice of interculturalism 
created a strong and complicated reaction or “blowback” against reasonable accommodation in 
the province.  
 In the years after the “Hérouxville Affair” and the “Bouchard-Taylor Commission,” 
questions and conflicts around reasonable accommodation remained central to political debate in 
the province. Running on a promise to establish a “future charte de la laïcité,” the separatist Parti 
Québécois won a minority government in the 2012 election and soon promised to introduce a 
“Charter of Quebec Values” that included regulations prohibiting provincial workers from 
wearing “conspicuous” religious symbols and a mandatory requirement that one’s face had to be 
uncovered when providing or receiving a state service. More moderate in its language, this 
Charter more or less embraced the same interculturalism at the heart of Hérouxville’s “code of 





conduct.” The ensuing controversy around the Charter, the defeat of the PQ only 20 months later, 
and the return of a majority Liberal government might be interpreted as a firm and final end to 
the accommodation crisis. However, despite a 2015 Supreme Court ruling that a ban on face 
veils during citizenship ceremonies was unconstitutional, Quebec’s Liberal government 
maintains that public services must be dispensed and received with the face uncovered. In other 
words, while it may no longer be making as many headlines, the same conditions that led to the 
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1 These two interpretations are well represented in the broader literature on multiculturalism. For example, 
Phil Ryan, in his recent book Multicultiphopia (2010), does a good job describing the development and 
difficulty of the first view in relation to multiculturalism. In the introduction, he writes that fear of 
multiculturalism or “multicultiphobia”, while a product of a “diffuse anxiety” and a “suspension of clear 
cause-effect thing” backed up by “no evidence,” is nonetheless  not mere “foolishness”, “irrational” or 
“something else in disguise: racism, nostalgia for a lost WASP world” (4-5). In turn, rather than just 
dismissing critics as misinformed and bigoted, and thus not worthy of an exchange of ideas, Ryan calls for 
productive dialogue toward a better understand and implementation of multicultural policy. Alana Lentin 
and Gavan Tiley do well to describe the second view. They note that the “death of multiculturalism” and 
the “failed experiment of multiculturalism” has been precipitated in part by “attacks on the illiberalism of 
minority and Muslim populations, and on the ‘relativist’ licence multiculturalism has accorded them” (6).  
2
   A similar definition of religious practice was used in the 2004 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem case. Where 
the court sided with the claimant’s interpretation of his religious obligation to build a Succah (a temporary 
hut built outdoors as part of the Jewish holiday Succat) on his balcony instead of the communal Succah 
recommended by Jewish religious leaders and despite condominium by-laws banning structures on 
balconies “irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is 
in conformity with the position of religious officials.” As Lefebvre does well to summarize, “The Amselem 
judgment was a turning point in the Canadian judicial view of freedom of religion, bestowing it a purely 
subjective definition” (2008: 192). Arguably, this subjectivity means that the Charter requires 
accommodation for an incredibly broad array of religious practices or what Jean-François Gaudreault-
Desbiens has called “religious supermarkets and do-it yourself religion” (as quoted in Lefebvre, 2008: 
193). 
3 According to Lisa Vanhala, the development of the concept of reasonable accommodation of religious practices 
in Canada coincided with a similar development in the disability rights movement around the idea of “indirect 
discrimination based on the idea that an action that is seemingly neutral can be discriminatory if it results in 
inequality.” Because the world is based on “able bodied norms,” people with disabilities are more likely to 
encounter unintentional barriers to equality (113-4). 





                                                                                                                                                             
4  A few years later, with the 1989 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia decision where Justice 
McIntyre commented that the “accommodation of differences...is the true essence of equality” (at 169), 
Section 15 of the Charter came more broadly to mean that certain Canadians were not simply to be 
protected against discrimination but also that any position of inequality or disadvantage that stemmed from 
such discrimination had to be ameliorated or accommodated to prevent their exclusion from mainstream 
society. Lori Beaman explains that “The use of the language of accommodation in the adjudication of 
religious freedom claims outside of employment law is a recent phenomenon. Reasonable accommodation 
arose in the context of employment law as a way to articulate the necessary standard to be used by 
employers in dealing with requests for exemption from particular work requirements. These requests for 
exemption usually arose in relation to religious beliefs, and the standard of reasonable accommodation, 
unless it caused undue hardship, was established by the Supreme Court of Canada in a trilogy of cases. 
Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; Bhinder v. C.N., [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 561; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489. (pg. 
443). 
5  As they put it in the introduction of their article: 
 
Should women or African-Americans claim they are victims of discrimination on the basis of 
disability-because they are regarded as being physically or mentally impaired in the performance 
of major life activities-rather than on the basis of sex or race? At first, the question seems 
insulting, suggesting, as it does, that there is something aberrant or defective about not being male 
or white. Or perhaps the question is merely pointless: if federal civil rights laws broadly prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, age, and disability-as they do-
then what difference does it make how we categorize forbidden conduct? But how the law defines 
discrimination makes a big difference in the kinds of remedies it provides (2). 
6  As Tim Nieguth and Aurélie Lacassagne point out in their article “Contesting the Nation: Reasonable 
Accommodation in Rural Quebec”:  
 
“Democracy” and its derivatives are used liberally in the description of communal norms in 
Hérouxville. Thus, the English version of the standards mentions democracy no fewer than ten 
times in the space of five pages. The preamble to that version references democracy on three 
occasions, claiming that the Standards themselves “come from our municipal laws being Federal 
or Provincial, and all voted democratically” (Municipalité Hérouxville, 2007a: 1).  
7
  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/crucifix-to-stay-in-national-assembly-drainville-1.1402340 
 
8
  Taylor (1994) writes: “As a presumption, the claim is that all human cultures that have animated whole 
societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings” (66). 
9
  Strangely, Taylor even argues that “the last thing one wants at this stage from Eurocentered intellectuals is 
positive judgments of the worth of cultures that they have not intensively studied” (70) or “a favourable 
judgment [about a culture] made prematurely”, as though a Eurocentered intellectual that did intensively 
study a particular culture could then pronounce a mature judgment on its worth or lack of worth. 
10
   In their co-authored book Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure explain: 
The diversity of beliefs and values that has taken root as one of the structuring features of 
contemporary societies often produces ethical and political disagreements that erode the social 
bond to varying degrees. One of the questions that divides citizens is the legitimacy of measures of 
accommodation whose aim is to allow certain people to respect beliefs at odds with those of the 
majority…Some people believe that religious accommodations are at odds with the principles of 
social justice at the foundation of democratic and liberal political systems. One of the strongest 
criticisms of these accommodations is based on the principle that public norms and institutions 
must treat the citizenry as a whole in an equitable manner (2011: 62-3). 
 
And, after presenting their sense of the how reasonable accommodation functions, the authors admit that: 





                                                                                                                                                             
And though some maintain that the obligation for accommodation is derived from more general 
principles of justice, such as the right to equality and freedom of conscience and religion, others 
believe that religious accommodations are more akin to preferential treatment and are 
consequently inequitable. These two positions are defended by citizens in the public sphere, by 
legislators and judges in official forums, and by theorists in the contemporary debates of political 
philosophy (2011: 64). 
  
 
